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INTRODUCTION
Safety-net hospitals play a vital role in the health system by providing disproportionate amounts of indigent care. Because of these populations' low reimbursement rates, safety-net hospitals operate with little financial leeway. Therefore, understanding the marginal impact of policies that might further reduce safety-net hospitals' bottom line is important to ensure these hospitals' viability.
One policy states are increasingly adopting is a mandate that Medicaid beneficiaries receive their coverage through managed care. This move to managed care has largely stemmed from efforts to reduce Medicaid spending. Under traditional Medicaid, the provision of public health insurance is coordinated by the state. Providers may choose to accept or decline Medicaid 1 , and Medicaid beneficiaries are free to seek care from any provider willing to see them. Under Medicaid managed care, Medicaid coordination is outsourced to private organizations who are frequently paid 95% of traditional Medicaid spending. However, with an incentive to generate profit, these organizations will attempt to trim spending by more. Managed care organizations do so by negotiating rates with providers and then imposing restrictions on which providers beneficiaries may see. As a result, the move from traditional Medicaid to Medicaid managed care breathes competition into the market but heightens the boundaries that restrict individuals' behavior.
There have been concerns that states' adoption of Medicaid managed care may be weakening safety-net hospitals financially. If managed care organizations move enrollees to different settings of care, then this could alter the composition of safety-net hospitals' caseloads. A disruption of safety-net hospitals' delicate caseload could prevent their ability to cross-subsidize care. Yet, empirical evidence is lacking to validate this effect. This study uses a quasi-experimental design to determine whether these concerns are warranted. The results suggest that the expansion of Medicaid managed care weakened safetynet hospitals financially. These hospitals' average ratio of payment-to-cost fell by an estimated 1.6 percentage-points. The effect on safety-net hospitals was also disproportionate.
This effect heterogeneity was such the gap in safety-net hospitals' financial vulnerability relative to the rest of the hospital system widened as a result of the reform.
To maintain a healthy hospital system, state policymakers should exercise caution before moving forward with Medicaid managed care. The Affordable Care Act has prescribed cuts to safety-net hospitals' subsidies which are set to take effect in 2018. If statelevel reforms preemptively position safety-net hospitals nearer the margin, then the total effect could be severe.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on Medicaid managed care and the pilot program this study considers. The data source and sample construction are described in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 provide explanations of the identification and estimation procedures used. Results are presented in Section 6 and discussed in Section 7. Section 8 ends with concluding remarks.
BACKGROUND

Medicaid Managed Care and the Safety-Net
Since the 1990s, the use of managed care has grown in Medicaid. Currently, all U.S.
states, with the exception of Alaska and Wyoming, offer some form of Medicaid managed care. Traditional Medicaid finances enrollees' healthcare by offering to pay providers prespecified rates in exchange for particular medical services. Medicaid beneficiaries may seek care from any provider willing to provide service in exchange for Medicaid's fee-for-service rate.
Once the service is performed, money flows directly from the state to the provider. There are minimal instituted barriers to care.
Under Medicaid managed care, states contract managed care organizations to coordinate enrollees' healthcare and to provide reimbursement to providers. In return for this work, states typically pay managed care organizations using a capitated rate. This structure provides states with cost predictability. Additionally, because capitated rates are frequently set 5% below traditional fee-for-service rates, this provides an opportunity for states to reduce Medicaid spending.
In order for managed care organizations to be able to turn a profit with 95% of fee-forservice rates, these organizations must manage Medicaid enrollees' healthcare consumption in a very efficient manner or reduce service quality. (Grogan & Patashnik, 2003) In practice, this means directing Medicaid enrollees away from unnecessarily expensive forms of care. Managed care organizations achieve this feat by negotiating what they deem are acceptable rates with providers and then facilitating Medicaid enrollees' movement towards these providers using innetwork lists. Not only does this framework allow managed care organizations to lock-in favorable prices (Cutler et al., 2000) , but it also gives managed care organizations leverage in dissuading inefficient types of care (e.g., unnecessary inpatient stays and emergency room visits).
On top of being financially preferable to states, Medicaid managed care has been touted for its potential to expand the set of doctors available to Medicaid enrollees. Because of the low reimbursement rates paid by traditional Medicaid programs, the number of providers willing to accept Medicaid patients was/is particularly limited. Consequently, if managed care organizations are able to bring formerly inaccessible providers in-network, then this could possibly encourage access to care.
Although the presumed consequences of Medicaid managed care were optimistic on the outset, when Medicaid managed care initially rolled out, there was some concern that safety-net providers might be harmed. (Baxter & Mechanic, 1997; Gold, 1999; Hurley & Somers, 2003; Lipson & Naierman, 1996; Sparer & Brown, 2000) The reason for this concern centered around the notion that Medicaid managed care might change the composition of safety-net providers' caseloads (and thereby their sources of funding) such that it would reduce their ability to crosssubsidize care. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of case studies were conducted to measure the impact on safety-net facilities. (Gold et al., 1996; Grogan & Gusmano 1999; Holahan et al., 1998; Horton et al., 2001 ) These generally reported adverse effects. Consistent with financial strain on safety-net providers, other studies reported a decline in access to care among individuals with no insurance following the implementation of Medicaid managed care. (Cunningham 1999; Waitzkin et al., 2002) In a notable exception, however, it was reported in one study that, "safety-net providers are coping". (Haberer et al., 2005) Since Additionally, because these cuts will be felt almost exclusively by hospitals inside of the safetynet, it is also likely that they will widen the gap that separates safety-net hospitals' financial 2 Under the ACA, Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments were originally set to be reduced by $500M in FY2014, $600M in FY2015 and FY2016, $1.8B in FY2017, $5B in FY2018, $5.6B in FY2019, and $4B in FY2020. Medicaid DSH cuts have since been delayed to 2018. In the revised schedule, Medicaid DSH allotments will be reduced by $2B in FY2018, $3B in FY2019, $4B in FY2020, $5B in FY2021, $6B in FY2022, $7B in FY2023, and $8 in both FY2024 and FY2025. vulnerability from that of the rest of the hospital system. Consequently, if the viability of safetynet hospitals is to be ensured, then it is important that states understand the marginal impact of instituting Medicaid managed care before moving forward with further implementation. This is so that the totality of state and federal reforms will not inadvertently push safety-net hospitals too far.
Florida's Medicaid Reform Pilot Program
The policy change this study exploits to determine the effects of Medicaid managed care In Florida, the mandatory Medicaid managed care organizations took the form of either a
Medicaid Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a Provider Service Network (PSN). The
PSNs (networks unique to Florida) differed from the commercially licensed/contracted HMOs in that the PSNs were directly controlled and operated by Florida physicians. These organizations, which were largely formed around safety-net physicians, were primarily instituted as a concession to lobbyists who believed that Florida safety-net providers would be harmed by the reform. Additionally, unlike the HMOs (which were only reimbursed by the state using a capitated rate), the PSNs could be reimbursed using either a fee-for-service or capitated rate. In practice, the PSNs widely favored fee-for-service. to choose between a set of ten HMOs and five PSNs, enrollees in Duval county (population ~0.85M) were allowed to choose between a set of four HMOs and three PSNs, and enrollees in Baker, Clay, and Nassau counties (the rural counties surrounding Duval) could each choose between one HMO and one PSN. 4 (Bragdon, 2011) If an individual failed to select a plan, then he/she was automatically assigned one by Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration. For families with incomes below the TANF limit (i.e., ≤23% of the federal poverty line) with assets less than $2,000, children (depending on age) whose family's income was <200% of the federal poverty line, and Medicaid beneficiaries receiving Supplemental Security Income, enrollment in one of the managed care plans was mandatory. According to the initial Medicaid reform application, managed care participation would also be required for the individuals eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, "upon the development and inclusion of an integrated service delivery system for individuals aged 60 and older." Participation in managed care was optional for other Medicaid enrollees living within reform counties, as it was in the rest of the state.
The Florida Medicaid Reform Pilot Program continued to operate until August 1, 2014.
Florida is currently in the process of mandating Medicaid managed care statewide. A question which has remained unanswered, however, is if/how the expansion of Medicaid managed care affected safety-net hospitals financially. In an attempt to answer this question, I examine the impact of the Florida pilot program on safety-net hospitals' average ratio of payment-to-cost and compare it to the impact on others.
DATA
The data used in this study come from the Agency for Health Care Administration, Florida Center for Health Information and Policy Analysis and consists of individual records on all hospital discharges in the state of Florida between the years 2000 and 2012. Included in the dataset are patients' discharging facility, year and quarter of discharge, county of residence, payer source, total gross charge, and information related to patients' conditions and diagnoses.
Because safety-net status is not explicitly defined, safety-net status is manually assigned by matching discharging facilities to the list of hospitals which were members of the Safety Net observations.
The dependent variable in this study, payment-to-cost, is constructed using national statistics on average payment-to-cost ratios across payer groups and years. Payment-to-cost Table 1 .
A pre-reform comparison of the hospitalizations within safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals is provided in Table 2 . As might be expected, the average ratio of payment-to-cost was lower among hospitals inside the safety-net (101.9% compared to 102.6%). Consistent with this disparity, the composition of safety-net hospitals' caseload was noticeably different. Outside of the safety-net, roughly one in seven hospitalizations was to a patient covered by Medicaid and roughly one in twenty hospitalizations was to a patient that was uninsured. Inside of the safetynet, approximately one in four hospitalizations was to a patient covered by Medicaid;
approximately one in fifteen hospitalizations was to a patient that was uninsured.
Also provided in Table 2 
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
To understand the impact of Florida's Medicaid Reform Pilot Program on safety-net hospitals, there are two types of effects I wish to identify. First, I would like to identify the extent to which safety-net hospitals were directly affected. Second, I would like to identify the extent to which safety-net hospitals were disproportionately affected.
To motivate this dual identification, it is important to reiterate that safety-net hospitals are dissimilar from other hospitals in terms of their financial vulnerability. While safety-net hospitals operate near the margin, other hospitals operate a further distance away. A clearly important question is whether safety-net hospitals' financial vulnerability increases or decreases relative to its initial position (i.e., the direct effect). A similarly notable outcome is whether safety-net hospitals' dissimilarity becomes more or less pronounced. If there is no disproportionate effect on safety-net hospitals, then the gap between safety-net and other hospitals' average ratio of payment-to-cost will remain unaffected. If, however, the impact on safety-net hospitals is disproportionate, then the gap will widen or narrow.
To identify the direct effect of Medicaid managed care on safety-net hospitals, I use a standard difference-in-differences approach. This identification strategy exploits the existence of individuals that were unaffected by the Florida reform in the post-intervention period. To ensure that a one-to-one comparison of the treatment and control groups in the post-intervention period is not biased by an underlying dissimilarity between groups, it subtracts from the two groups' post-intervention difference in outcomes their difference before intervention. Alternatively, to ensure that a pre/post comparison within the treatment group is not biased by a simultaneous external shock, it subtracts from the treatment group's pre/post difference in outcomes any pre/post difference in the control group.
In the present study, the treatment group consists of individuals that were residents of a reform county at the time of their hospitalization. The control group consists of patients that lived in any other Florida county. The pre-intervention period includes quarters before the pilot program's implementation; the post-intervention period includes quarters after. In a simple twoperiod model where residence in a reform county is denoted R and the post-reform period is denoted P, the difference-in-differences effect can be expressed as: 
The resultant estimate is interpreted as the direct effect of the Medicaid Reform Pilot Program on safety-net hospitals' y.
To identify the disproportionate effect of Medicaid managed care on safety-net hospitals, I can use the structure of equation (1) For clarity, it should be noted that identification in equation (2) is not based on tripledifference estimation, although the equation is structurally identical. This is because tripledifference estimation exploits three dimensions of control. Here, I exploit only two dimensions of control: in the time dimension, the pre-reform period, and in the space dimension, residency in a non-reform county. The third dimension, hospital type, offers no control group. Both safetynet and non-safety-net hospitals were immune to treatment from the Florida reform.
Consequently, identification remains rooted in double-difference estimation, and the introduction of the third dimension is used for an alternative purpose. That is, to change the effect that is being identified, not the source of identification.
ESTIMATION
The standard regression forms of equations (1) and (2) 
When equation (3) is estimated on the sample of only encounters at safety-net hospitals, the coefficient α 3 will align with difference in conditional expectations given by equation (1). When equation (3) is estimated on the pooled sample of encounters at all hospitals, the coefficient β 7
will align with the difference in conditional expectations given by equation (2).
In the present study, the multi-period implementation of the Medicaid Reform Pilot
Program complicates the definition of P in the generic equations (3) and (4). This is because P switches on at different times in the reform counties, making no clear switching threshold for non-reform counties. To address this, I estimate amended versions of equations (3) and (4) in which P is replaced by a vector of quarter-of-discharge dummy variables (Q') any time the "post" term is independent of R. In addition to capturing the multi-period implementation of the reform, this "roll-out" of treatment aids with identification as the treatment threshold is now independent of a single point in time. This method of handling the "post" variable also accounts for time trends, which are likely to emerge across a period of 13 years. This yields the following specifications: residence. This is to ensure that the precision of the difference-in-differences estimates will not be leveraged by the finer cell divisions beneath the level in which the policy variation occurs.
There are 67 counties in Florida. Tables 3 and 4 are the difference-in-differences estimates for the effects of the Florida reform. A graphical depiction of the reform's effect on safety-net versus other hospitals is provided in Figure 2 . These each provide evidence that the expansion of Medicaid managed care heightened safety-net hospitals' level of financial vulnerability.
RESULTS
Presented in
The difference-in-differences point-estimate for the direct effect on safety-net hospitals is statistically significant and negative. (Table 3 ) This indicates that safety-net hospitals' average ratio of payment-to-cost fell by 1.6 percentage-points as a result of the Florida reform. Similarly, Figure 2 is suggestive of an adverse effect. While payments to safety-net hospitals generally exceeded costs before the expansion of Medicaid managed care, payments began to dip below costs around the time of the pilot program's implementation.
The difference-in-differences point-estimate for the disproportionate effect on safety-net hospitals is also statistically significant and negative. (Table 4 ) This indicates that the average ratio of payment-to-cost fell by an estimated 1.8 percentage-points more among the hospitals inside than outside of the safety-net. The magnitude of this estimate implies that the financial strain that was generated by the expansion of Medicaid managed care was felt exclusively by safety-net hospitals. The trends shown in Figure 2 are consistent with this result. As shown, the disproportionate effect on safety-net hospitals was such that gap separating safety-net hospitals' financial vulnerability from other hospitals' vulnerability widened in response to the reform.
To test the robustness of the above findings, I first repeat the estimation, weighting by total gross charge. The above results reflect the impact on an average per hospitalization. If costs were systematically higher within particular payer groups, then the average per hospitalization will not align with the average per $1 of cost. While weighting observations by the cost of care would be ideal, cost information is not provided in the Florida dataset. I therefore weight all regressions by charges, a noisy proxy for cost. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the results are robust to this adjustment. Weighted regressions generate difference-in-differences point-estimates that differ from previous estimates by no more than 0.3 percentage-point. All effects move in the same direction.
As a second check of robustness against my payment-to-cost assignments, I again repeat the estimation, but change the dependent variable to an indicator for a "low payer". If low payers generate relatively more uncompensated care, then higher shares of low-payers will likely correspond to increased financial strain. I define low payers using three alternative cuts: The results using this outcome generally conform with previous findings. As shown in the final columns of Tables 3 and 4 , the difference-in-differences estimates for the direct effect on safetynet hospitals consistently indicate that the reform increased safety-net hospitals' share of low payers across all definitions of the variable. However, the difference-in-differences estimates for the disproportionate effect on safety-net hospitals are imprecise. For the one low payer classification that generates a statistically significant point-estimate at the 90% confidence level, it is predicted that safety-net hospitals' share of low payers increased by disproportionately more.
DISCUSSION
The principal finding of this study is that the use of Medicaid managed care increases safety-net hospitals' financial vulnerability. This form of Medicaid provision is estimated to reduce safety-net hospitals' average ratio of payment-to-cost. There is also some evidence that it exacerbates the gap that separates safety-net hospitals' vulnerability from the rest of the hospital system.
It is important to note that the results of this study are specific to one state's implementation of Medicaid managed care. One state's implementation of Medicaid managed care will not perfectly align with all others'. For the reader interested in generalizing these results to other settings, it is important to carefully consider the similarities between the comparator's hospital system and Medicaid program and those of Florida at the time of reform.
Additionally, the difference-in-differences design relies on the assumption of "parallel worlds". While this assumption cannot be formally test, as there is a counterfactual we cannot observe, plotting the trends between the treatment and control groups is useful to gauge the plausibly that this assumption is satisfied. As shown in Figure 2 , safety-net hospitals' average ratio of payment-to-cost appears to diverge between the treatment and control groups around the time of the intervention. However, the treatment and control groups' ratios tracked fairly consistently before and after the split at the intervention threshold.
In spite of these limitations, the results of this study provide a needed contribution to the economic literature. Evidence from Florida suggests that concerns regarding Medicaid managed care's impact on safety-net hospitals are warranted. There is a cost to adopting Medicaid managed care that has largely gone unnoticed. This cost should be taken into consideration so the viability of a key player in the healthcare system will not be inadvertently threatened. 
